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Abstract  
We study how political parties select political leaders. Using regression 
discontinuity design and data from Finnish local elections, we find that parties 
use vote ranks to decide upon promotions. Moreover, we show that this primary 
effect is higher when competition either between or within parties is lower. We 
document differences in promotion patterns between parties, the primary effect 
being stronger in right-wing parties. This result is in line with previous research 
arguing that right-wing parties prefer more inclusive nomination procedures. 
Finally, our descriptive analysis suggests that parties weight previous political 
experience and candidates’ policy positions in their promotion decisions more 
than voters value these characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
How do political parties select the people who get promoted to leading political positions? 
The answer is not that obvious and political scientists have been referring to political 
promotions as the “black box” or “secret garden” of politics (e.g. Gallagher and Marsh 1988, 
Field and Siavelis 2008, Hazan and Rahat 2010, Folke et al., 2015a). Promotions are often 
considered to be an internal matter, and parties may even be reluctant to reveal any details to 
outsiders.  
Many countries around the world, for example Austria, Brazil, Finland, Indonesia, 
Japan, Latvia and Sweden, use electoral systems with open or semi-open lists in which a 
voter can, and sometimes even has to, express her preference for a particular candidate 
amongst many fielded by a party. Therefore, outcomes of such elections necessarily reflect 
voter preferences for individual candidates at least to some extent. Our main question is 
whether voter preferences are also accounted for in the within-party negotiations for political 
promotions. Understanding the links between election outcomes and political nominations is 
crucial in understanding accountability, how well voter preferences are reflected in actual 
policies and how electoral institutions interact with the selection of political leadership. 
In a recent paper, Folke et al. (2015a) argue that electoral success should matter when it 
comes to political promotions. They show empirically that winners of the preferential vote in 
Swedish local semi-open list elections are more likely to become local party leaders or, if 
they belong to the largest party, hold more important positions in the local government than 
the runners-up, even if winners and runners-up have almost the same amount of votes. They 
label this effect as the “primary effect” with the idea that the local elections serve the role of 
primary elections in the following intra-party negotiations. Moreover, they provide additional 
evidence from Brazil where the winners of open-list elections turn out to become candidates 
in mayoral elections more often.1  
Our paper provides an important addition to literature on comparative politics and 
design of electoral systems by exploring the primary effect on political promotions in Finland 
                                                 
1 The role of vote rank is also analyzed by Anagol and Fujiwara (2016), who study so-called 
runner-up effect in Brazilian, Indian and Canadian elections. They find that second-place 
candidates in elections have substantially higher probability of winning subsequent elections 
than close third-place candidates. Pope (2009) and Hartzmark (2015) study the role of rank-
based norms in more general settings. 
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where open-list elections are in use. We focus on promotions to the position of the chairman 
of municipal board which is the most important political position in the Finnish local 
governments.2  To obtain causal estimates of the primary effect, we use regression 
discontinuity design (see e.g. Lee and Lemieux 2010), or RDD. Same identification is also 
used by Folke et al. (2015a).3 The main findings in Folke et al. (2015a) are largely 
corroborated with our baseline results. We do not find any primary effect in municipalities 
where there are absolute majorities, but in other municipalities, winners of the election are 
around 20 percentage points more likely to get promoted. Overall, ranking first 
approximately doubles the chances of political promotion. This effect is very close to what 
Folke et al. (2015a) find in Sweden. This is interesting for at least two reasons. On the one 
hand, preferential votes might have different roles in semi-open and open-list systems. Semi-
open list elections allow voters cast a personal vote if they want to, and if they do, they 
probably have some reason for it. In open-list elections voters cast a personal vote merely 
because they always have to. Therefore, a preferential vote could be a stronger signal on 
voter preferences in semi-open than open-list elections, and thus, have a larger effect on the 
political promotions. On the other hand, it has even been argued that semi-open list system is 
merely a closed-list system in disguise (e.g. Farrell 2001, Mueller 2005 and Andeweg 2005). 
Hence, one might not expect that the preference votes play any role in the Swedish system. 
Our findings combined with those of Folke et al. (2015a) suggest that this is not the case. 
While the effects of various electoral systems on political behavior have long interested 
political scientists (e.g. Duverger 1954, Grofman and Lijphart 1986 and Sartori 1994), the 
idea of Folke et al. (2015a) is novel in the literature and certainly deserves more attention. It 
is interesting to evaluate if parties take individual candidates' vote rank – in isolation of the 
vote share – into account in political nominations also in other countries than Sweden and 
Brazil. While the Brazilian open-list evidence in Folke et al. (2015a) is limited only to 
                                                 
2 This corresponds to the main outcome that Folke et al. (2015a) analyze in their paper. The 
main outcome in Folke et al. (2015a) is holding the top position on the party ballot in the next 
elections. In their data, 9 times out 10, the board chairman position goes to top placed 
candidate of the largest party. We look directly at the board chairman position, because in the 
Finnish open-list system the positions on the party ballot are not relevant.   
3 E.g. Eggers et al. (2015) provide extensive lists with some of the previous work employing 
RDD, and de la Cuesta and Imai (2016) and Skovron and Titiunik (2015) provide surveys on 
the most recent developments in RDD in the setting of close elections. 
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nominations to candidacy in mayoral elections, we study exactly the same type of promotion 
in Finland as Folke et al. (2015a) study in Sweden. Political promotions and nominations to 
candidacy in elections might be very different outcomes by their nature. Moreover, Sweden 
and Finland are more alike than Sweden and Brazil in other respects as well, suggesting that 
comparison between semi-open and open-list elections is cleaner here. 
We take three steps further from the previous work. First, we provide an alternative 
analysis of the role of political competition. Folke et al. (2015a) argue that the primary effect 
should be larger when the political environment is more competitive. Empirically, they find 
some support for the theoretical framework, but they do not make a clear division between 
external competition between political parties and internal competition within them. We aim 
to clarify this distinction by using direct measures of political competition and find that both 
internal and external political competition actually decrease the primary effect. These 
findings are in line with the argument made by Hirano and Snyder (2014) who reason that 
primaries are introduced to promote individual electoral competition within dominant parties 
in localities where political competition is weak. Our second new insight is that we study 
differences in the primary effect across the political spectrum. Previous work on candidate 
and leadership selection in political parties has suggested that left-wing parties may prefer 
more centralized selection processes (e.g. Duverger 1954, Janda and King 1985 and Lisi et 
al., 2015). We argue that this might be reflected in the primary effect as well. In line with this 
reasoning, we show that the primary effect is larger for the right-wing parties than for the 
left-wing parties. 
Finally, the open-list system also provides us a novel opportunity to compare voters’ 
and parties’ preferences for politicians. We find such comparison useful for shedding more 
light on political promotions. Even descriptive empirical evidence of this nature seems to be 
almost non-existent in the previous literature. Our descriptive results imply that parties take 
also into account politicians’ other qualifications and not only their popularity as measured 
by votes or vote ranks. For instance, we document that board chairmen tend to have more 
previous political experience than other elected politicians and even other election winners. 
They are also more competent than other candidates or elected politicians to the extent we 
can measure it by income and education, for example, but less competent than the most 
popular candidates. Parties also seem to prefer policy position cohesion more than the voters.  
Studying these determinants of political promotions is not only important from political 
scientists’ and voters’ perspective. Leaders may matter for economic outcomes (e.g. Jones 
and Olken 2005 and Besley et al., 2011), or there might be monetary benefits from political 
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power (e.g. Folke et al., 2015b; see also Kotakorpi et al., 2015 for economic returns to 
political office in Finland). 
2. Local Politics in Finland 
Currently, there are 313 municipalities in Finland, and they have a very important role in the 
Finnish system. See, for instance, Moisio et al. (2010) for an extensive overview of Finnish 
municipalities. On average, the local governments spend about five thousand euros per capita 
annually and about 20% of the workforce is employed by the municipalities. The majority of 
this expenditure is used to take care of statutory responsibilities which include social and 
health care, primary education, childcare, town planning, civil engineering (e.g., roads and 
waste and water management) etc. To cover their expenditures, Finnish municipalities are 
allowed to collect income taxes and out-of-pocket payments from users of municipal 
services. In addition, municipalities receive a share of corporate taxes and fiscal grants from 
the central government. 
Decision-making in Finnish municipalities is led by local councils which are 
responsible for the operation and economy of the municipality. Decisions are taken by a 
simple majority of the council members. The council appoints a municipal executive board to 
prepare decision-making and it can also set up committees to deal with different functions, 
for example, social and health services, education or urban planning. Both the municipal 
boards and the committees usually have a preparatory role, and the final decisions are made 
in councils. Mayors are civils servants hired by the council and have only an executive role 
but no decision-making power.  
Municipal councils are elected in municipal elections that are organized every fourth 
year, on the fourth Sunday of October. The council's term starts at the beginning of the next 
calendar year and ends at the end of the next election year. Finland has open-list electoral 
system in which voters cast their vote directly to a single candidate. Voter cannot vote only 
for a party, but her vote is also counted as a vote for the party list that the candidate belongs 
to.4 Hence, a vote affects the number of seats a party list can obtain and also ranks the 
                                                 
4 Each candidate is assigned a candidate number which the voter has to write on the ballot. 
Official lists of candidates, their numbers and occupations, ordered by party affiliation, are 
shown to voters e.g. in the voting booth and often in local newspapers. Order of the parties is 
decided by lottery and candidates are ranked alphabetically within the lists. 
4
 
 
candidate within that party list.5 Seats in the municipal council are allocated using the 
d'Hondt method, and the total number of seats, varying between 13 and 85, depends on the 
size of the population. 
After the local elections are held, the parties bargain with each other about how to 
divide the seats in municipal board and committees. Moreover, the parties need to agree on 
how to share chairman positions in the local council, municipal board and committees. The 
position of municipal board chairman, comparable to a mayor in many other countries, is 
considered to be the most important position in local politics. In a survey conducted in 1996, 
74% of local politicians who responded said that chairmanship of municipal board is the most 
desired position. Moreover, over two thirds of the respondents said that board chairman has 
more political power than council chairman (Sinisalmi 1999).6 In most cases, the largest party 
gets to nominate the board chairman and the remaining positions are shared between parties 
that hold seats in the local council. Of course, the most valuable positions are usually given to 
the members of the largest coalition (Sinisalmi 1999). According to our data, if some party 
holds an absolute majority, it tends to get all most important chairman positions. If there is no 
absolute majority in the municipality, the board chair goes most often to the largest party 
whereas the council chair is most often from the second largest party.  
The municipal elections held between 2000 and 2012 were dominated by three large 
parties from the political left, center and right: the Social Democratic Party, the Center Party 
and the National Coalition Party, respectively. Other parties that hold seats in municipal 
councils include the Left Alliance, the Green Party, the True Finns, the Swedish People's 
Party and the Christian Democrats. Many municipalities also have local, often independent or 
one-agenda political groups that are not registered parties but hold seats in local councils. 
                                                 
5 The personal qualities of candidates have a great impact on Finnish voters. In a survey 
(KAKS 2008), voters were asked whether they base their voting decision on candidates or 
parties. Around half of the repliers said that they base their decision on party affiliation 
whereas around 40% responded that their decision is based purely on the candidates' 
personalities. 
6 Finnish local politicians are paid for each meeting they attend. According to survey 
conducted by Kuntaliitto (see Pekola-Sjöblom 2014), the board chairmen also get slightly 
higher salary (on average, 2,500 € per year and 100 € per meeting in 2013) than council 
chairmen (on average, 2,006 € per year and 101 € per meeting). In some of the largest 
municipalities, the board chairman is a paid full-time job. 
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Absolute majorities are a rather common phenomenon in Finnish municipalities. At the 
present, one party holds more than half of the seats in roughly every third local council. This 
party is almost always either the Center Party or the Swedish People's Party. 
3. Data 
This paper combines municipal election data from the Finnish Ministry of Justice and data on 
politicians’ positions in the local government collected by the Association of Finnish Local 
and Regional Authorities (Kuntaliitto 2013). These data are available for four elections 
between 2000 and 2012 and the respective electoral terms, with the exception that the 
committee chairmen are observed only for the last term.7 The data are further merged with 
data on municipal employee status from KEVA, income data from the Finnish Tax 
Administration and socio-economic characteristics from Statistics Finland which are used 
when checking for covariate balance. 
Three further notions regarding the data should be made. First, we leave out two 
municipalities in 2004, as there are mistakes in their election results. Second, the chairmen 
are observed at the beginning of each electoral term, and there could be some unobserved 
changes during the four-year term. For example, parties could agree that chairman's term is 
shorter than four years and another person takes his place at some point. Third, chairmen of 
the municipal boards need not be elected politicians. We identify 42 such board chairmen in 
our data. As they did not participate in the elections, we cannot include them in our empirical 
analysis. 
In the main parts of our empirical analysis, we use only data on candidates who are 
either winners or runners-up within their party lists. In a few cases of draws in the vote counts 
at the top, there are more than one winner or runner-up. We drop such lists out of the sample. 
We concentrate on the party lists that get to nominate the board chairman, as other cases have 
                                                 
7 The data from the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities does not include 
candidate numbers for all years and sometimes there are typing errors or other mistakes in the 
candidates’ names. The merging was partly carried out using fuzzy string matching 
algorithms after which the results were checked manually. This could leave a possibility of 
errors. However, the amount of possible errors is likely to be very small, because for the part 
of data where we know the perfect match due to observing the candidate numbers, also the 
matching algorithm was able to produce the perfect match. 
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no variation of interest in the outcome variable. We are interest only in the within-party 
decisions on who to promote rather than on the between-party allocation of chair positions, 
and thus, the population of interest is only the lists that get the chair position. After these 
restrictions are made, there are 2704 candidates in our sample, half of whom are winners and 
half runners-up.  
Table A1 in Appendix A provides a rough comparison between the winners and 
runners-up. We notice immediately that the most popular candidates are more likely to obtain 
important positions in local government than runners-up, but at the same time, they are 
different in other dimensions as well. For example, they are more successful in the elections 
measured by the number of votes and vote share, and also more likely to be incumbents, have 
university education, have higher earnings and have higher socio-economic status. These 
differences indicate that winners could be more competent than runners-up and hence more 
likely to get promoted to top positions also for other reasons than their electoral performance.  
We report also deviations in policy positions regarding public sector size or 
redistribution. These measures have been computed as candidates’ policy positions’ 
Euclidian distances from their party-group median using selected questions from voting aid 
application by the Finnish public broadcasting company, Yle. Voting aid applications are 
interactive questionnaires the purpose of which is to assist voters in choosing a candidate 
with similar policy preferences to theirs. Our definition of the indices relies on Savolainen 
(2015) who identifies voting aid application questions that are related to public sector size 
and redistribution. See Savolainen (2015) for a detailed description of voting aid applications 
in Finnish local elections in general and the questions that are used to compute our measures. 
Because the focus of the study is on how parties choose to fill the most important 
position of the board chair, we also report the allocation of that position by party and party 
rank in Table A2. A key observation from the table is that when a party gets an absolute 
majority in the municipality, it gets the board chair in 98% of cases, whereas in the case of no 
absolute majority, the largest party gets the board chair only in 66% of cases. In the first case, 
also the second largest and sometimes even the third largest party are able to obtain the board 
chair. These patters indicate that coalition formation and between-party political competition 
and bargaining in the leadership selection process are likely to be important in determining 
which party gets the desired position. 
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4. Theoretical Background 
Decision-makers may base their decisions on rank-based norms or rules in various contexts. 
Some examples documenting such phenomenon include Pope (2009), who shows that 
hospitals that improve their rank attract more patients in the future, and Hartzmark (2015), 
who studies rank effects in investors’ asset trading behavior. Recent work by Anagol and 
Fujiwara (2016) and Folke et al. (2015a) has shown that ranks have relevance also in 
electoral settings: vote ranks in electoral systems with preferential voting can be reflected in 
future electoral success or advancements in political career. Relevant to our study, Folke et 
al. (2015a) argue that first-ranking candidates should be more likely to be promoted to 
political power. We summarize their main arguments in three points: 
(i) If votes (or vote ranks) matter when parties decide about nominations and 
promotions, politicians might have stronger incentives to put more effort in individual 
campaigning. This is undoubtedly desirable from the parties' perspective as well. 
Responsiveness could also be preferred by voters (see e.g. Hopkin 2001, Rahat 2008 and 
Maravall 2008), not least because they care about policy in which leadership could be 
important. 
In Finnish municipalities, an ultimate case where being chairman matters is a tied vote. 
Then, the chairman's vote breaks the tie. Moreover, the chairmen of municipal boards are 
often involved in hiring process of new public officials with whom they often are in close 
cooperation with. Public officials are considered to have notable power in Finnish 
municipalities (see e.g. KAKS 2008). The chairmen can act as political leaders who exploit 
their high position to achieve partisan goals. Besides the municipal board meetings, they also 
have the right to participate council and committee meetings. They can also act as democratic 
leaders who try to promote common goals that have been agreed upon by the majority. In 
both cases, chairmen could have a considerable impact on the policy decisions. 
(ii) Folke et al. (2015a) draw an analogy with primary elections, in which party 
members or voters choose the party's candidate. If voters prefer more transparent nomination 
procedures (e.g. Harmel and Janda 1994 and Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006), the party 
might be able to attract more votes if they matter beyond the election result. 
There is clearly voter demand for transparent nomination procedures in Finnish local 
politics. For instance, a survey conducted by Kunnallisalan Kehittämissäätiö found that 
around two out of three voters said that parties should declare their candidates for important 
political positions (KAKS 2008).  
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(iii) If any decision rule exists, votes (or vote ranks) would be a simple and objective 
rule to be followed when promotions and nominations are in question. 
There are also other potential explanations. For instance, parties might adapt such a 
promotion rule to eliminate middle-rank activists or internal conflicts within the party to 
achieve a stronger cohesion (e.g. Katz and Mair 1995). Hortala-Vallve and Mueller (2015) 
theorize that parties introduce primaries when the party heterogeneity is too great and parties 
are in danger of splitting into smaller political groups. Furthermore, local newspapers usually 
write about the election winners and speculate about nominations. Voters tend to be 
unsatisfied if the most popular politicians are not given any important positions, which can 
also be seen in the media. This might pressure the local party groups to give their most 
popular candidates important positions in the local government. 
5. Regression Discontinuity Design 
Simply regressing the outcome, becoming the chairman of a municipal board, on a 
candidate's vote rank within his party list only tells us something about the correlation 
between these variables. One central concern is there could be omitted characteristics of 
politicians that bias the estimates to an unknown degree and direction. For instance, more 
able politicians might attract more votes and rank high in the election results, but they could 
also be more likely to receive top positions due to their skills. These characteristics might be 
observable to the voter but not to the econometrician. In order to overcome the concerning 
endogeneity issues in estimating the impact of vote rank on political promotions, we will 
employ regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach. 
In the regression discontinuity design, we rely on the assumption that conditional on 
flexibly controlling for some forcing variable, close elections can be considered to be as good 
as random. We compare close winners with close runners-up, who are likely to be similar in 
their characteristics, by estimating regression functions of the form 
 
Yit = α + β1{vit > 0} + f(vit) + εit, 
 
where Yit is the outcome of interest. vit is the forcing variable measuring the distance from the 
threshold between ranking first or second. 1{vit > 0} is an indicator function for ranking first 
and β is the coefficient of interest. If f(vit) is approximately correctly specified within a 
bandwidth, there is no precise manipulation of the forcing variable (i.e., the density is smooth 
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at the threshold) and covariates evolve smoothly at the boundary, then β will be the causal 
estimate of the primary effect. In other words, under these assumptions, 1{vit > 0} is not 
correlated with the error term εit. 
As advised in recent work (e.g. Gelman and Imbens 2014), we will execute the design 
using local polynomial specifications. There is no consensus on which polynomial degree to 
use. Our implementation follows closely Hyytinen et al. (2015) who evaluate regression 
discontinuity design in the Finnish close election setting by comparing RDD results with the 
results from actual randomizations which happen when two (or more) candidates tie for the 
last seat. We use local linear and quadratic polynomials which are estimated separately for 
both sides of the cutoff. The optimal bandwidth used in the regressions is chosen following 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). We will explore the robustness to alternative bandwidths, 
too. Finally, we conduct also RDD with bias correction and robust inference as suggested by 
Calonico et al. (2014). We fix the main and pilot bandwidths to be the same. Calonico et al. 
(2016) argue that this is an optimal choice. All local regressions use a triangular kernel. 
There are various ways of calculating and scaling the forcing variable and it is not 
obvious which should be preferred. For the sake of consistency and comparison, we follow 
Folke et al. (2015a) and use the relative winning margin as the forcing variable. It is defined 
as the vote distance of winner (runner-up) from runner-up (winner) divided by the total 
number of their votes. This means that the threshold for becoming the winner is set at zero. 
It is not obvious that we will be able to capture any primary effect using RDD that 
identifies a local effect at the threshold where both the winner and runner-up are almost 
equally popular. That is, they have (almost) the same amount of votes, but the other politician 
is just ranked higher. Employing RDD as the empirical strategy necessarily implies that we 
can only identify the direct effect of vote ranks. The primary effect estimated in this way, if 
present, requires that rank has relevance up and above the vote count. The theories presented 
in Section 4 do not make a clear distinction between votes and vote ranks. Vote ranks could 
be more important, for example, if they are more salient indicators of success in elections or 
voters attach some special value to winning. Previous research has argued that political 
parties in party-centered environments have incentives to place popular persons, such as 
candidates with good local reputation high on their electoral lists to maximize their 
performance in elections (e.g. Shugart et al. 2005). Folke et al. (2015a) argue that the same 
logic should hold also for promotions to top positions. Unfortunately, the RDD setting does 
not allow studying the role of popularity per se. Future research should aim to find alternative 
strategies to evaluate this aspect. 
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6. Primary Effect on Political Nominations 
This section reports and discusses our regression discontinuity design results. We report a 
rigorous set of validity and robustness checks in Appendix B. These checks support the 
validity of the empirical design and the robustness of the results that we find. 
6.1 Main Effects 
Let us begin the empirical analysis by looking at the standard RDD graphics for chairman 
position in the municipal board. To give an overall picture of the data, we first plot global 
polynomials to (almost) the whole range of the data. Second, we show local linear and 
quadratic plots and binned averages within the optimal Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) 
bandwidths.8 Based on the regression fits in Figure 1, it appears that the primary effect is 
present also in the Finnish open-list system (Panel A), but only when no party holds absolute 
majority (Panels B and C). 
The regression results reported in Table 1 largely verify what we learned from the 
graphics. Column (1) reports the OLS estimates which do not have a causal interpretation, 
and in columns (2)-(6), we show various RDD results. While the estimates in Panel A are 
robust across different specifications (i.e., different bandwidths and polynomials), they lack 
statistical significance. This turns out to be due to the fact that the primary effect is virtually 
zero in municipalities where the council has a party with absolute majority (Panel B). Once 
we restrict our attention to councils without absolute majorities (Panel C), we find that the 
first-ranking candidates are about 20 percentage points more likely to become board 
chairmen than the runners-up. Given that among close runners-up the probability of being 
promoted is around 20 %, ranking first almost doubles the chance of political promotion. 
Why municipalities with and without absolute majorities differ from each other may be 
related to political competition and bargaining between parties. Municipalities with absolute 
majorities have potentially less political competition which could result in smaller primary 
effects, as we discuss in the following sub-section. However, our subsequent empirical 
                                                 
8 We use two different data-driven methods to choose the bins (see Calonico et al. 2015), 
depending on the type of the figure. The figures showing global polynomials use evenly-
spaced bins that mimic the variance in the data, as this approach gives a richer picture of the 
data. For the sake of clarity, local polynomial plots use an IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced 
method which results in a smaller amount of bins. In subsequent figures, we will concentrate 
on the latter type of graphics. 
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findings on the role of competition point to the opposite direction. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that political competition would explain why there is no primary effect in this case. 
It is reasonable to assume that when a party with absolute majority appoints the board 
chairman, it may do so without hearing what other parties have to say. Inter-party bargaining 
in the case of no absolute majorities could shape also political promotions and push the 
parties towards nominating their most popular candidates. 
Folke et al. (2015a) find that in Sweden, 30% of close runners-up become chairmen of 
municipal boards while the respective share is 60% for close winners. While the baseline 
probabilities are larger than what we find in Finnish local councils, the overall effect is very 
similar in both cases. The similarity of the effect is striking in two ways. First, some political 
scientists have claimed that semi-open list systems are, in fact, merely closed lists in disguise 
because voters tend to cast their votes on the candidates placed on top of the list (e.g. Farrell 
2001, Mueller 2005 and Andeweg 2005). However, we find very similar primary effect in the 
Finnish political context where open lists are in use. Second, preferential votes might have a 
different role in semi-open list elections (in which a voter votes for a party in the first place 
but have also the possibility to give a preferential vote for some candidate on that list) and 
open list elections (in which the vote is cast to a candidate with some party attachment). 
Voters who cast a preferential vote might do so with some kind of purpose in a semi-open list 
system, whereas they do so only because they have to in an open list system. Therefore, 
casting a personal vote could be a stronger signal in Sweden than in Finland when it comes to 
political promotions. Our results suggest that this is not the case, either.  
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Notes: Figure shows global quartic and local linear fits and binned averages. Local linear polynomials are fitted 
within the optimal Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidths. 
 
Figure 1. RDD graph on becoming the chairman of municipal board. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the primary effect. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary effect 0.187*** 0.105* 0.069 0.117 0.089 0.097 
[0.020] [0.061] [0.045] [0.084] [0.059] [0.062] 
N 2704 942 1610 1152 1878 1610 
R2 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  
Bandwidth   0.07 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.14 
Panel B: Absolute majority in municipality 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Primary effect 0.074** -0.023 -0.021 -0.038 -0.037 -0.040 
[0.030] [0.085] [0.060] [0.135] [0.094] [0.080] 
N 1030 346 646 334 632 646 
R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01   
Bandwidth   0.06 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.13 
Panel C: No absolute majority in municipality 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Primary effect 0.257*** 0.216* 0.171** 0.239** 0.155* 0.241**  
[0.027] [0.113] [0.081] [0.118] [0.084] [0.103]    
N 1674 402 708 738 1200 708 
R2 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04                 
Bandwidth   0.05 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.11 
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear 
(bias-corrected) 
Bandwidth   0.5 * IK(1) IK(1) 0.5 * IK(2) IK(2) IK(1) 
Notes: The outcome is being chairman of municipal board. Sample includes winners and 
runners-up from the party nominating the board chair. Standard errors shown in brackets. For 
standard approaches, we report robust standard errors clustered at municipality level, and for 
bias-corrected estimates, we report robust standard errors. Optimal bandwidths are chosen 
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). IK(1) refers to the bandwidth optimized for the 
linear specification and IK(2) for the quadratic specification. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
  
6.2 Effects by Competition and Competence  
Folke et al. (2015a) argue that the primary effect may be context-specific. First, we will 
explore potential role of political competition. Previous research has shown that higher 
external competition among political parties makes the party behavior more efficient and the 
quality of politicians higher (see e.g. Galasso and Nannicini 2011, De Paola and Scoppa 2011 
and Aragón 2013). Folke et al. (2015a) argue along these lines that when the political 
environment is more competitive, the parties need to follow the voters' preferences more 
closely in terms of political nominations. Additionally, political scientists have linked higher 
competition with party cohesion, claiming that when parties are electorally safe, they tend to 
give their representatives way to disunity (e.g. Sartori 1976). This is another potential channel 
through which competition potentially affects the primary effects. If the political environment 
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is more competitive, parties might want to enhance the political unity by introducing 
transparent nomination procedures.  
Folke et al. (2015a) do not make clear division between internal and external 
competition, but they argue that their empirical results are mainly in line with the theoretical 
outline. We employ direct measures of external and internal competition: party seat share 
Herfindahl index and vote margin within party for the last seat it receives, respectively. As 
we do not find any effects in the case of absolute majorities in our main analysis, we will 
concentrate on municipalities without such majorities and split the sample in two by the 
median values of the competition measures. Another rationale for excluding the absolute 
majorities is that the nature of especially inter-party competition is very different in such 
municipalities, which might confound our results. Moreover, there is not much variation in 
the between-party dimension amongst the absolute majority group. We stress that we cannot 
give a causal interpretation to the results as we are conditioning the regressions on potentially 
endogenous factors. 
Figure 2 and Table 2 reveal that both the level of external (Panel A) and internal 
competition affects the primary effect negatively (Panel B). The estimated effect is larger and 
also statistically significant when competition is lower. This is perhaps surprising, given the 
theoretical arguments discussed above. However, the findings align with the argument made 
by Hirano and Snyder (2014) who argue that primaries are introduced in the U.S. to promote 
individual electoral competition within dominant parties in localities where political 
competition is weak. Hence, it may be that parties in Finnish local politics adapt a nomination 
rule based on the vote ranks in order to induce more competition within and even between 
parties. Note also that our measure of internal competition measures overall competition 
within the party rather than competition on the top position. This exactly the kind of measure 
we want for testing the Hirano and Snyder (2014) argument. 
Another potential explanation is that we cannot properly distinguish between the level 
of competition and size of the municipalities. Typically, elections in smaller municipalities 
are characterized by lower degree of competition than elections in cities. When we split the 
sample by the median size of municipalities, we obtain very similar estimates as in Table 2 
(not reported) – the primary effect is larger in smaller municipalities. It might be that the 
tasks are more demanding in larger municipalities, and hence parties want to promote the 
most experienced, not necessarily the most popular, candidates to chairmanship. Moreover, 
the pressure to promote the most popular politicians to political power is likely to be larger in 
15
 
 
smaller communities in which voters more often have some type of direct connection to the 
local politicians. 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows local fit and binned averages. Local polynomials are fitted within the respective optimal 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidths. 
 
Figure 2. RDD graph, primary effect by competition. 
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Table 2. Primary effect by competition. 
 
Panel A: External competition 
High external competition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary effect 0.249*** 0.122 0.097 0.137 0.090 0.055 
[0.038] [0.127] [0.099] [0.153] [0.117] [0.124] 
N 836 264 454 360 580 468 
R2 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03   
Bandwidth   0.08 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.15 
Low external competition (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Primary effect 0.265*** 0.207 0.297** 0.331* 0.286** 0.313**  
[0.037] [0.187] [0.130] [0.193] [0.137] [0.132]    
N 838 166 314 328 552 342 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04                
Bandwidth   0.04 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.09 
Panel B: Internal competition 
High internal competition (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Primary effect 0.249*** 0.122 0.097 0.137 0.090 0.111 
[0.038] [0.127] [0.099] [0.153] [0.117] [0.119] 
N 836 264 454 360 580 454 
R2 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03   
Bandwidth   0.08 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.15 
Low internal competition (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Primary effect 0.265*** 0.207 0.297** 0.331* 0.286** 0.314* 
[0.037] [0.187] [0.130] [0.193] [0.137] [0.180] 
N 838 166 314 328 552 314 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04                
Bandwidth   0.04 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.09 
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear 
(bias-corrected)
Bandwidth   0.5 * IK(1) IK(1) 0.5 * IK(2) IK(2) IK(1) 
Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Sample includes winners and runners-up from all 
parties that nominate the board chairman, excluding municipalities with absolute majority. For standard 
approaches, we report robust standard errors clustered at municipality level, and for bias-corrected 
estimates, we report robust standard errors. Optimal bandwidths are chosen following Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012). IK(1) refers to the bandwidth optimized for the linear specification and IK(2) for 
the quadratic specification. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, 
respectively. 
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Next, we turn to the role of candidate competence. Folke et al. (2015a) note that 
learning models suggest that additional information is valuable for the political parties 
especially when they are comparing candidates with similar observable characteristics. 
Therefore, we should expect to see higher primary effect when the winner and the runner-up 
are similar in their characteristics. We analyze the primary effect when the winner and the 
runner-up are both incumbents or just one of them is incumbent in Figure 3 and Table 3.9 Our 
results do not justify the claim, as it is hard to distinguish the estimates from each other under 
the two alternative scenarios. 
 
 
Notes: See notes in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3. RDD graph, primary effect by competence. 
  
                                                 
9 Folke et al. (2015a) test this prediction using a more complex measure for candidate quality 
defined as in Besley et al. (2014). We believe that incumbency status serves as a sufficient 
measure. For instance, Eggers et al. (2015) argue that incumbency status captures also many 
other quality characteristics of the candidates. 
0.
20
0.
30
0.
40
0.
50
Ch
ai
rm
an
 o
f m
un
ici
pa
l b
oa
rd
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Winning margin
Panel A: Both incumbents
0.
00
0.
20
0.
40
0.
60
Ch
ai
rm
an
 o
f m
un
ici
pa
l b
oa
rd
−0.40 −0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40
Winning margin
Panel B: Mixed incumbency
18
 
 
Table 3. Primary effect by competence. 
 
Both incumbents (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary effect 0.225*** 0.214 0.084 0.243 0.073 0.248* 
[0.039] [0.160] [0.114] [0.172] [0.122] [0.136] 
N 958 258 442 450 714 442 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03   
Bandwidth   0.06 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.12 
Mixed incumbency status (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Primary effect 0.289*** 0.195** 0.185** 0.059 0.187 0.208**  
[0.040] [0.087] [0.073] [0.208] [0.136] [0.084]    
N 622 408 566 230 376 566 
R2 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Bandwidth   0.21 0.41 0.09 0.18 0.41 
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear (bias-corrected)
Bandwidth   0.5 * IK(1) IK(1) 0.5 * IK(2) IK(2) IK(1) 
Notes: See notes in Table 2. 
  
 
6.3 Effects by Party Ideology  
Previous research has documented potential differences in candidate selection methods across 
the political spectrum. Such differences can be found in forms of, for example, gender quotas 
for candidates (e.g. Caul 2001), or different appointment and voting systems (e.g. Rahat and 
Hazan 2001). Among earlier works, Duverger (1954) and Janda and King (1985), for 
instance, have argued that left-wing parties are more likely to choose centralized candidate 
selection processes than right-wing parties, although the origins of such differences are not 
entirely clear. However, some authors (see e.g. Shomer 2014) find weaker support for party 
differences in candidate selection. Nevertheless, if any ideological differences exist, they may 
extend even beyond candidate selection, also to leadership selection. Lisi et al. (2015) use 
cross-country data for over more than half a century to show that parties with different 
ideologies differ in terms of leadership selection methods. For instance, left-wing parties 
more often make their leadership choices within party organs than center and right-wing 
parties, while center and right-wing parties give the power to voters, party members and 
conference delegates more often than the left-wing parties. If the right-wing parties prefer 
more inclusive nomination procedures also in the case of Finnish local politics, then we 
should expect to find a higher primary effect for them than for the left-wing parties. 
To analyze whether this is the case, we group the political parties in two blocs, (center-) 
right-wing and left-wing parties, and estimate the primary effect for these subsamples. The 
division between left and right is not strikingly clear in Finnish politics, especially at the local 
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level, but we can provide at least a crude division based on the bourgeois versus socialist 
origins of the parties. Parties we assign to the right-wing bloc are the Center Party, National 
Coalition Party, True Finns, Swedish Party and Christian Democratic Party, and parties in the 
left-wing bloc are the Social Democratic Party and Left Alliance. Again, we concentrate on 
municipalities where there is no absolute majority in power. This is natural due to facilitating 
comparison with the results in the previous sections, and due to reasons discussed there, but 
also because almost all of the absolute majority parties would be classified as right-wing.  
The RDD plots in Figure 4 as well as the estimates in Table 4 suggest that, indeed, 
there are differences between parties. For the right-wing parties (Panel A), we estimate a 
statistically significant primary effect of 20-30 %, while the estimates for left-wing parties 
(Panel B) are smaller, less robust and not statistically significant. One caveat, however, is that 
we have only a very limited number of observations in the case of left-wing parties, and our 
findings could be merely due to the small sample size. Moreover, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the effects are statistically significantly different for the two blocs. 
Nonetheless, the pattern seems quite clear. 
One potential explanation for differences across parties could be that some of the 
parties could be more policy-oriented, and thus, more likely to choose the leaders whose 
political standing is closer to the party ideology, whereas other parties might behave 
opportunistically and thus be more prone to listen to the voter preferences. In order to 
evaluate whether this explains our findings, we examine whether board chairmen’s policy 
positions deviate less from the party median than the party list winner’s positions. While it 
appears in Table 5 that board chairmen are closer to the party median than party list winners, 
we cannot make any clear distinction between left- and right-wing blocs. This may also be 
due to small number of observations for the left-wing politicians. In Appendix C, we also 
show that both the board chairmen and party list winners are much closer to party median 
than other elected or all other candidates, but again the pattern is similar across the left-right 
dimension. 
In order to get some idea of what could be behind our results, we interviewed 
informally five local politicians. Discussions with them suggest that the differences could 
partially arise from different party cultures or links with other interest groups in the society. 
For instance, the left-wing parties may tend to listen to what the Labor Unions have to say 
about political promotions, and their views may not always reflect the views of voting 
population. Future research should explore this avenue more closely and with more rigorous 
interview protocol. 
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Notes: See notes in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 4. RDD graph, primary effect by ideology. 
 
Table 4. Primary effect by party ideology. 
 
Panel A: Right-wing parties 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Primary effect 0.240*** 0.274* 0.223** 0.252 0.280** 0.307**  
[0.031] [0.148] [0.101] [0.198] [0.129] [0.135]    
N 1268 320 564 436 742 564 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04                  
Bandwidth - 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.11 
Panel B: Left-wing parties 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Primary effect 0.333*** 0.121 0.049 0.200 0.115 0.112 
[0.052] [0.139] [0.128] [0.163] [0.151] [0.131] 
N 390 124 222 136 234 222 
R2 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07                  
Bandwidth - 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.17 
Specification OLS Local linear Local quadratic Local linear 
(bias-corrected)
Bandwidth   0.5 * IK(1) IK(1) 0.5 * IK(2) IK(2) IK(1) 
Notes: See notes in Table 2. 
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Table 5. Deviations from median policy positions by party blocs. 
 
Panel A: Right-wing parties 
  Board 
chairmen 
  Party list 
winners 
    
Variable Mean   Mean   Difference
Deviation in policy position, public sector size 2.27   2.60   -0.33*** 
Deviation in policy position, redistribution 2.18   2.33   -0.15* 
N 194   271     
Panel B: Left-wing parties 
  Board 
chairmen 
  Party list 
winners 
    
Variable Mean   Mean   Difference
Deviation in policy position, public sector size 2.40   2.73   -0.33 
Deviation in policy position, redistribution 2.26   2.23   0.04 
N 26   31     
Notes: Sample includes politicians from the parties that nominate the board chairman, excluding 
municipalities with absolute majorities. Difference in means is tested using t test adjusted for 
clustering at the municipality level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 
% levels, respectively. 
  
7. Preferences for Political Leaders	  
While we do find evidence of the primary effect in Finland, the fact that in many subsamples 
the effect is not present at all suggests that vote ranks are at best complementary to other 
leader selection criteria. Since parties do not always pick the politicians most preferred by the 
voters, parties and voters may have different tastes for political leaders’ qualifications. The 
comparison between board chairs and party list winners provides us with a window in to 
analyzing this. Moreover, comparing board chairmen with other politicians can tell us more 
about differences in the levels of competence. We stress that unlike the causal analysis on the 
primary effect, this exercise is merely descriptive in its nature. 
In Table 6, we show means of various characteristics for four different groups: board 
chairmen, party list winners, all elected candidates and all candidates. To facilitate better 
comparison, the latter three groups exclude the board chairs and only include the party lists 
that got to nominate the board chair. In Appendix C, we report comparisons that do not make 
the latter sample restriction. Moreover, we compare the differences in means between the 
board chairmen and each of the other groups.  
Several interesting observations arise from these comparisons. First, board chairmen 
are on average more experienced based on incumbency status, previous leadership experience 
and age than candidates in any other group. Second, board chairs earn more, are less often 
unemployed and have higher education than the other elected or all candidates. This suggests 
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some positive selection into power based also on their level of competence. Third, the board 
chairs are less educated and earn less than the list winners, implying that voters would have 
preferred competence even more than the parties. Fourth, the share of women among the 
chairs is much lower than among the election winners hinting towards some possible gender 
bias in promotions.10 Finally, the Finnish parties nominate cohesive party leaders whose 
policy opinions are closer to party average that those of the other elected politicians, all 
candidates or the list winners. 
Summa summarum, it seems that parties prefer experience and cohesiveness more than 
voters whereas voters have slightly larger preference for other metrics, especially 
competence. Nonetheless, the findings hint that the Finnish parties perform fairly well in 
promoting more competent politicians to important positions in the local government. 
Our findings are corroborated with regression results in Appendix Tables C3, C4 and 
C5 where we regress a dummy for becoming board chairman on rank dummies and a set of 
other covariates. We use three different samples that correspond the data used in the 
comparisons in Table 6. Consistent with the idea of vote ranks mattering for political 
promotions, a higher rank and more votes increase politicians’ likelihood of getting 
promoted. Moreover, political experience measured by incumbency status and previous 
leadership positions make political promotion more likely. The coefficient of female dummy 
is negative which hints towards possible gender bias in promotions. Being a member of the 
national parliament is negatively associated with being promoted to board chairman. Finally, 
the Finnish parties promote party leaders’ whose policy opinions are closer to the party 
median. 
This descriptive analysis relates to a recent paper by Dal Bó et al. (2015) who study 
how Swedish local politicians, including political leaders, compare to the population they 
represent. They find that Swedish local politicians are on average significantly smarter and 
better leaders than the population they represent, measured by test scores obtained in military 
cognitive and leadership tests. Similarly, leading politicians appear to be more competent 
than other politicians. The main difference between Finland and Sweden is that in the former 
voters have more say on who gets elected and in the latter parties’ role is more pronounced. 
Despite these differences, both political systems seem to be are able to achieve positive 
selection of elected politician and party leaders on competence. 
 
                                                 
10 See also Folke and Rickne (2016) who analyze the glass ceiling in politics. 
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Table 6. Board chairmen versus other politicians. 
 
  
Board 
chairmen   Party list winners  Elected candidates   All candidates 
Variable Mean   Mean  Difference Mean  Difference Mean   Difference 
Chairman of municipal 
board (t-1) 
0.35   0.05  0.29*** 0.02  0.33***  0.01  0.34*** 
Chairman of local 
council (t-1) 
0.08   0.14  -0.06*** 0.03  0.05***  0.01  0.07*** 
Incumbent (t) 0.87   0.67  0.20*** 0.56  0.32*** 0.26 0.62*** 
Incumbent (t-1) 0.69   0.48  0.21*** 0.35  0.35*** 0.17 0.52*** 
Member of parliament 0.01   0.12  -0.11*** 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01*** 
Age 51.73   47.59  4.14*** 47.63  4.10*** 46.60 5.14*** 
Wage income during the 
election year 
31856   33311  -1454 26373  5483***  24167  7689*** 
Female 0.21   0.33  -0.12*** 0.36  -0.15*** 0.40 -0.19*** 
University education 0.21   0.25  -0.04 0.18  0.03 0.16 0.05* 
Unemployed 0.01   0.01  0.00 0.02  -0.01 0.04 -0.03*** 
Student 0.00   0.01  -0.01* 0.02  -0.01*** 0.03 -0.03*** 
Entrepreneur 0.31   0.26  0.05** 0.28  0.04 0.20 0.11*** 
High professional 0.25   0.31  -0.06** 0.23  0.02 0.21 0.05 
Municipal employee 0.12   0.22  -0.09*** 0.21  -0.09*** 0.22 -0.10*** 
Deviation in policy 
position, public sector 
size 
2.28   2.48  -0.20* 2.59  -0.31***  2.71  -0.43*** 
Deviation in policy 
position, redistribution 
2.19   2.13  0.07  2.34  -0.15**   2.42   -0.23*** 
N 1436   936     16750      46324     
Notes: Sample includes only politicians from the parties that nominate the board chairman. Income during the election 
year is expressed in euros. Income and dummy for being municipal employee are not observed for the 2012 elections. 
Deviations in policy position are observed only in 2012 for a subset of candidates. Statistical significance of the 
differences in means is tested using t test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
  
8. Conclusions 
This paper explores the determinants of political promotions in Finland. First, we find 
evidence of the primary effect in Finland where completely open-list elections are in use. 
This effect is heterogeneous in the degree of political competition, the primary effect being 
larger when the political environment is less competitive. We also present new evidence that 
party identity matters. In our case, the primary effect is present mainly within the right-wing 
parties. Our results indicate that this is likely not due to differences in the level of policy-
orientation. Rather than that, interviews with local politicians tentatively suggest that parties’ 
connections to other interest groups, such as the Labour Unions, may explain why parties 
differ in how they conduct the party nominations. We also report that parties seem to prefer 
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experience and cohesiveness more than voters, whereas voters have slightly larger preference 
for other metrics, in particular, competence. 
While the effects of various electoral systems have long attracted the interest of 
political scientists (e.g. Duverger 1954, Grofman and Lijphart 1986, Sartori 1994), the idea of 
Folke et al. (2015a) is entirely novel in the political science literature. Hence, it deserves 
more attention. It is particularly interesting to study similar promotions as Folke et al. (2015a) 
study in the Swedish semi-open list elections in a relatively similar environment with 
different electoral system.  The results for Finland and Sweden are very similar both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  
The results of this paper are arguably important from the voters' perspective, as it 
appears that the votes matter also beyond the electoral outcomes under certain conditions. 
Moreover, leading politicians’ competency and qualifications may matter for real policy 
outcomes. While evaluating the link between selection of political leaders and policy 
outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper, it is nonetheless important to understand how the 
leaders are selected. So far many political scientists have referred to political promotions as a 
“black box” or “secret garden”, which indeed indicates that more research on leader selection 
in politics ought to be conducted. 
  
25
 
 
References 
Anagol, S., Fujiwara, T. (2016). The Runner-Up Effect. Journal of Political Economy 124(4), 
927–991.  
Andeweg, R. (2005). The Netherlands. The Sanctity of Proportionality. In The Politics of 
Electoral Systems (eds. Gallagher, M., Mitchell, P.). Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Aragón, F.N. (2013). Political parties, candidate selection, and quality of government. B.E. 
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 13(2), 783–810. 
Besley, T., Montalvo, J.G., Reynal-Querol M. (2011). Do Educated Leaders Matter? 
Economic Journal 121(554), 205–227. 
Besley, T., Folke O., Persson, T., Rickne, J. (2014). Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the 
Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden. Mimeo. 
Calonico, S., Cattaneo M.D., Farrell, M.H. (2016). On the Effect of Bias Estimation on 
Coverage Accuracy in Nonparametric Inference. Working Paper. 
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M.D., Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust Nonparametric Confidence 
Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs. Econometrica 82(6), 2295–2326.  
Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M.D., Titiunik, R. (2015). Optimal Data-Driven Regression 
Discontinuity Plots. Journal of the American Statistical Association 110(512),  
1753–1769. 
Carey, J.M., Polga-Hecimovich, J. (2006). Primary Elections and Candidate Strength in Latin 
America. Journal of Politics 68, 530–543. 
Caul, M. (2001). Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-
National Analysis. Journal of Politics 63(4), 1214–1229. 
de la Cuesta, B., Imai, K. (2016). Misunderstandings about the Regression Discontinuity 
Design in the Study of Close Elections. Forthcoming in Annual Review of Political 
Science. 
Dal Bó, E., Finan, F., Folke, O., Persson, T., Rickne, J. (2015). Who Becomes a Politician? 
Working Paper. 
26
 
 
De Paola, M., Scoppa, V. (2011). Political Competition and Politician Quality: Evidence 
from Italian Municipalities. Public Choice 148, 547–59. 
Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. 
Wiley, New York. 
Eggers, A.C., Fowler, A., Hainmueller, J., Hall, A.B., Snyder J.M. (2015). On the Validity of 
the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence 
from over 40,000 Close Races. American Journal of Political Science 59(1), 259–274. 
Farrell, D. (2001). Electoral Systems. A Comparative Introduction. Palgrave, Basingstoke. 
Field, B.N., Siavelis P.M. (2008). Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities:  
A Research Note. Party Politics 14(5), 620–639. 
Folke, O., Rickne, J. (2015). The Glass Ceiling in Politics: Formalization and Empirical 
Tests. Comparative Political Studies 49(5), 567–599.  
Folke, O., Persson, T., Rickne J. (2015a). The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political 
Promotions. Forthcoming in American Political Science Review. 
Folke, O., Persson, T., Rickne J. (2015b). Dynastic Political Rents. Working Paper. 
Galasso, V., Nannicini, T. (2011). Competing on Good Politicians. American Political 
Science Review 105(1), 79–99. 
Gallagher, M., Marsh, M. (1988). Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. The 
Secret Garden of Politics. Sage, London.  
Gelman, A., Imbens, G. (2014). Why High-order Polynomials Should not be Used in 
Regression Discontinuity Designs. NBER Working Paper No. (20405).  
Grofman, B., Lijphart, A. (1986). Electoral Laws & Their Political Consequences. Agathon 
Press, New York.  
Harmel, R., Janda, K. (1994). An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change. 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(3), 259–287.  
27
 
 
Hartzmark, S.M. (2015). The worst, the best, ignoring all the rest: The rank effect and trading 
behavior. Review of Financial Studies 28(4), 1024–2059. 
Hazan, R.Y., Rahat, G. (2010). Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and 
their Political Consequences. Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Hirano, S., Snyder J.M. (2014). Primary Elections and the Quality of Elected Officials". 
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9, 473–500. 
Hopkin, J. (2001). Bringing the Members Back in? Party Politics 7(3), 343–361.  
Hortala-Vallve, R., Mueller, H. (2015). Primaries: the unifying force. Public Choice 163, 
289–305. 
Hyytinen, A., Meriläinen, J., Saarimaa, T., Toivanen, O., Tukiainen, J. (2015). Does 
Regression Discontinuity Design Work? Evidence from Random Election Outcomes. 
VATT Working Papers 59.  
Imbens, G., Kalyanaraman, K. (2012). Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression 
Discontinuity Estimator. Review of Economic Studies 79(3), 933–959.  
Janda, K., King, D.S. (1985). Formalizing and Testing Duverger’s Theories on Political 
Parties. Comparative Political Studies 18(2), 139–169. 
Jones, B., Olken, B. (2005). Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since 
World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(3), 835–864.  
KAKS. (2008). Kansalaismielipide ja kunnat. Ilmapuntari 2008, KAKS Polemia 69.  
Katz, R.S., Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy:  
the emergence of the cartel party. Party Politics 1(1), 5–28.  
Kotakorpi, K., Poutvaara, P., Terviö, M. (2015). Returns to office in national and local 
politics. Working Paper. 
Kuntaliitto. (2013). Kuntien luottamushenkilötilasto. 
Lee, D.S., Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics. Journal of 
Economic Literature 48, 281–355. 
28
 
 
Lisi, M, Freire, A., Barberà, O. (2015). Leadership Selection Methods and Party Types.  
In The Politics of Party Leadership: A Cross-National Perspective  
(eds. Cross, W., Pilet, J.-P.). Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Maravall, J.M. (2008). The Political Consequences of Internal Party Democracy.  
In Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions and Accountability (eds. Maravall, 
J.M., Sánchez-Cuenca, I.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Moisio, A, Loikkanen, H.A., Oulasvirta, L. (2010). Public services at the local level  
– The Finnish way. VATT Policy Reports 2. 
Mueller, W. (2005). Austria: A Complex Electoral System with Subtle Effects. In The 
Politics of Electoral Systems (eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell). Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
Pekola-Sjöblom, M. (2014). Kuntien luottamushenkilöiden palkkiot ja korvaukset vuonna 
2013) Kuntaliiton julkaisusarja 1/2014.  
Pope, D.G. (2009). Reacting to Rankings: Evidence from America’s Best Hospitals. Journal 
of Health Economics 28(6), 1154–1165. 
Rahat, G., Hazan, R.Y. (2001). Candidate Selection Methods. An Analytical Framework. 
Party Politics 7(3), 297–322.  
Rahat, G. (2008). Which Candidate Selection Method is More Democratic? Working Paper, 
Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California-Irvine.  
Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Volume I. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Sartori, G. (1994). Comparative Constitutional Engineering. Macmillan, Basingstoke.  
Savolainen, R. (2015). Does Political Experience Influence Policy Positions? Mimeo. 
Shomer, Y. (2014). What affects candidate selection processes? A cross-national 
examination. Party Politics 20(4), 533–549. 
29
 
 
Shugart, M., Ellis Valdini, M., Suominen, K. (2005). Looking for Locals: Voter Information 
Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional 
Representation. American Journal of Political Science 49(2), 437–449. 
Sinisalmi, M. (1999). Suomen kaupunkien keskushallinto 1927–1998. Tutkimus kaupunkien 
keskushallinnon järjestämisestä sekä valtasuhteiden muutoksesta demokratian ja 
päätöksenteon näkökulmasta. Suomen Kuntaliitto, Helsinki.  
Skovron, C.,  Titiunik, R. (2015). A Practical Guide to Regression Discontinuity Designs in 
Political Science. Working Paper. 
 
 
  
 
  
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Primary Effect in Open-List Elections 
 
Appendices  
 
 
Jaakko Meriläinen Janne Tukiainen 
 
 
 
This appendix contains additional tables and figures to accompany paper “Primary Effect in 
Open-List Elections”. Appendix A reports descriptive statistics. Robustness and validity tests 
are organized in Appendix B. Appendix C shows additional comparisons of politicians.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics on winners and runners-up. 
                    
  Winners   Runners-up     
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.   N Mean Std. Dev.   Difference 
Chairman of municipal board 1352 0.36 0.48   1352 0.18 0.38   0.19*** 
Number of votes 1352 252 536   1352 165 288   87** 
Vote share (within municipality) 1352 5.12 2.29   1352 3.73 1.60   1.39*** 
Vote share (within party) 1352 12.74 5.76   1352 9.08 3.31   3.66*** 
Chairman of municipal board (t-1) 963 0.14 0.35   963 0.05 0.22   0.09*** 
Chairman of local council (t-1) 963 0.11 0.32   963 0.06 0.23   0.06*** 
Incumbent (t) 1352 0.74 0.44   1352 0.71 0.45   0.03 
Incumbent (t-1) 1352 0.51 0.50   1352 0.41 0.49   0.10*** 
Member of parliament 1352 0.09 0.28   1352 0.03 0.16   0.06*** 
Age 1352 48.70 10.24   1352 48.80 10.72   -0.09 
Wage income during election year 1063 33897 27247   1062 30228 21895   3669** 
Female 1352 0.31 0.46   1352 0.33 0.47   -0.02 
University education 1172 0.26 0.44   1150 0.22 0.41   0.04* 
Unemployed 1351 0.01 0.12   1352 0.01 0.09   0.01* 
Student 1351 0.01 0.10   1352 0.01 0.08   0.01 
Entrepreneur 1351 0.27 0.44   1352 0.29 0.45   -0.01 
High professional 1351 0.31 0.46   1352 0.28 0.45   0.03 
Municipal employee 1063 0.20 0.40   1063 0.20 0.40   0.00 
Deviation in policy position, 
public sector size 210 2.33 0.99   185 2.54 0.97   -0.21** 
Deviation in policy position, 
redistribution 210 2.17 0.91   185 2.25 0.85   -0.07 
National Coalition Party 1352 0.19 0.39   1352 0.19 0.39     
Social Democratic Party 1352 0.14 0.34   1352 0.14 0.34     
Center Party 1352 0.59 0.49   1352 0.59 0.49     
True Finns 1352 0.01 0.07   1352 0.01 0.07     
Left Alliance 1352 0.01 0.11   1352 0.01 0.11     
Swedish Party 1352 0.06 0.24   1352 0.06 0.24     
Christian Democrats 1352 0.00 0.05   1352 0.00 0.05     
Green Party 1352 0.00 0.00   1352 0.00 0.00     
Rest 1352 0.01 0.09   1352 0.01 0.09     
Notes: Sample includes winners and runners-up from parties that nominat the board chairman in the 2000, 2004, 2008 
and 2012 Finnish municipal elections. Only party lists with one elected winner and one electer runner-up are included. 
Income during the election year is expressed in euros and is not observed for the 2012 elections. Deviations in policy 
positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012 elections. Differences in means are tested using a t test 
adjusted for clustering at the municipality level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table A2. Share of chairmen of board by party and party rank. 
Panel A: Absolute majority in municipality 
Party/Rank Any 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Row N 
Any 1.000 0.984 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 558 
Center Party 0.860 0.874 0.000 - - - - - 480 
Social Democratic Party 0.011 0.004 0.444 - - - - - 6 
National Coalition Party 0.011 0.002 0.556 - - - - - 6 
Left Alliance 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - 0 
Green Party 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - 0 
True Finns 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - 0 
Swedish Party 0.111 0.113 0.000 - - - - - 62 
Christian Democrats 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - 0 
Other 0.007 0.007 0.000 - - - - - 4 
Column N 558 549 9 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Panel B: No absolute majority in municipality 
Party/Rank Any 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Row N 
Any 1.000 0.669 0.268 0.051 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.001 878 
Center Party 0.421 0.559 0.166 0.067 0.000 0.000 - 0.00 370 
Social Democratic Party 0.207 0.187 0.260 0.244 0.000 0.000 - 0.00 182 
National Coalition Party 0.294 0.194 0.494 0.578 0.250 0.000 - 0.00 258 
Left Alliance 0.021 0.010 0.043 0.044 0.000 0.000 - 0.00 18 
Green Party 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.00 0 
True Finns 0.009 0.000 0.017 0.022 0.375 0.000 - 0.00 8 
Swedish Party 0.032 0.044 0.000 0.022 0.125 0.000 - 0.00 28 
Christian Democrats 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.018 - 1.00 6 
Other 0.009 0.005 0.013 0.022 0.000 0.500 - 0.00 8 
Column N 878 587 235 45 8 2 0 1 - 
Notes: Table includes only municipalities in which the chairman of municipal board is an elected politician. There are 42 cases in 
which a non-elected politician has been appointed. Only party lists with one elected winner and one elected runner-up are 
included. 
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Appendix B: Robustness and Validity Checks 
 
This Appendix discusses the validity and robustness of our results. First, we show that the 
results obtained using both local linear and quadratic polynomials are robust to bandwidth 
selection in Figures B1-B5. These graphs do not give reason to doubt either the non-
significant results or the significant results we find. For the very smallest bandwidths, some 
estimates tend to converge towards zero but they also tend to have very wide confidence 
intervals and low number of observations. Hence, we do not believe that this is particularly 
concerning. 
Second, we verify that the covariates do not jump at the cut-off. Municipality and party 
level covariates are balanced by construction, as the forcing variable are defined within party 
lists and we only include cases with one winner and one runner-up per municipality, so we 
will concentrate on candidate level variables. These include number of votes, vote share 
within municipality and party, lagged outcome variables (council or board chairman t-1), age, 
incumbency status t and t-1, being elected in the national parliament, gender, income during 
the election year, dummy for being a municipal employee, and socioeconomic characteristics 
(dummies for university degree, student, unemployed, high professional and entrepreneur). 
For the covariate smoothness tests, we employ the same sample as in Panel C of Table 1. 
However, the same conclusions apply also when using other samples. The placebo outcomes 
show no robust and mainly insignificant jumps at the threshold (Table B1). The significant 
jumps in some rare specifications can be due to multiple testing or outliers close to the 
threshold.  
Third, we estimate primary effect at fake cut-offs (Figure B6). We demonstrate that 
significant primary effect of the estimated magnitude is found only at the true cutoff and not 
systematically anywhere else using the same sample as in Panel C of Table 1. This test 
34
 
 
supports the validity of our design and suggests that the estimated effect is real and not 
present, for example, only due to such curvature in the relationship between the forcing 
variable and the outcome that the regressions function is not able to capture. 
The estimations reported in this paper do not control for observables. In the case of 
regression discontinuity design, this is not needed. However, including additional covariates 
to the regressions serves as a good validity check. If the RDD truly works as it should, then 
the covariates ought not to change the estimates. If we include candidate characteristics to our 
RDD regressions, this does not alter the estimates substantially (results not reported).  
Note that unlike in usual RDD settings, we do not have to conduct the density test 
suggested by McCrary (2008), as the distribution is smooth by construction for two reasons: 
the way we define our forcing variable and the sample we use (there is only one winner and 
one runner-up for each party). 
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Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various 
bandwidths. Vertical line marks the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Dashed 
lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure B1. All bandwidths graph for Table 2. 
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Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various 
bandwidths. Vertical line marks the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Dashed 
lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure B2. All bandwidths graph for Table 3, Panel A. 
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Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various 
bandwidths. Vertical line marks the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Dashed 
lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure B3. All bandwidths graph for Table 3, Panel B. 
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Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various 
bandwidths. Vertical line marks the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Dashed 
lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure B4. All bandwidths graph for Table 4. 
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Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) for various 
bandwidths. Vertical line marks the optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Dashed 
lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure B4. All bandwidths graph for Table 5. 
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Table B1. Covariate smoothness. 
 
 
 
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) Covariate (37) (38) (39) (40)
1.297 -1.308 0.858 2.156 0.847 0.813 -1.079 1.116
[0.909] [1.579] [1.194] [1.937] [2.240] [1.681] [3.018] [2.320]
N 606 1016 450 792 N 510 870 550 950
R 2 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 R 2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Bandwidth 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.17 Bandwidth 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.28
(5) (6) (7) (8) (41) (42) (43) (44)
-0.009 -0.013 0.000 -0.007 0.048 0.024 0.164 0.046
[0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.009]   [0.097] [0.064] [0.155] [0.103]
N 872 1332 522 896 N 560 974 560 974
R 2 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 R 2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Bandwidth 0.10 0.21 0.11 0.22 Bandwidth 0.08 0.16 0.11 0.22
(9) (10) (11) (12) (45) (46) (47) (48)
-0.042* -0.060** 0.014 -0.016 0.058 0.019 0.105 0.060
[0.022] [0.028] [0.020] [0.028]   [0.122] [0.087] [0.162] [0.110]
N 760 1220 516 880 N 338 586 451 769
R 2 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 R 2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Bandwidth 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.21 Bandwidth 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.23
(13) (14) (15) (16) (49) (50) (51) (52)
0.050 0.032 0.037 0.032 0.025 0.021 0.062 0.029
[0.047] [0.040] [0.059] [0.046] [0.030] [0.018] [0.060] [0.038]
N 348 606 496 820 N 722 1170 568 978
R 2 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 R 2 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02
Bandwidth 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.23 Bandwidth 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.23
(17) (18) (19) (20) (53) (54) (55) (56)
0.037 0.002 0.112 0.026 0.016 0.019 0.008 0.017
[0.083] [0.049] [0.151] [0.082]   [0.021] [0.014] [0.028] [0.020]
N 314 566 346 604 N 716 1164 782 1238
R 2 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 R 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bandwidth 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.23 Bandwidth 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.26
(21) (22) (23) (24) (57) (58) (59) (60)
-0.140* -0.055 -0.318*** -0.128 0.004 0.004 -0.027 -0.007
[0.077] [0.054] [0.117] [0.083]   [0.075] [0.051] [0.113] [0.071]
N 600 1012 580 998 N 560 974 642 1078
R 2 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 R 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bandwidth 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.16 Bandwidth 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.29
(25) (26) (27) (28) (61) (62) (63) (64)
-0.053 -0.014 -0.163 -0.039 0.061 -0.072 0.257* -0.069
[0.107] [0.075] [0.134] [0.100]   [0.110] [0.079] [0.150] [0.104]
N 484 840 600 1012 N 430 738 534 926
R 2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 R 2 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00
Bandwidth 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.20 Bandwidth 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.22
(29) (30) (31) (32) (65) (66) (67) (68)
-0.007 0.015 -0.033 0.014 0.015 0.005 0.055 0.021
[0.050] [0.037] [0.085] [0.049] [0.079] [0.058] [0.113] [0.084]
N 422 728 480 826 N 456 760 472 770
R 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 R 2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Bandwidth 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.22 Bandwidth 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.24
(33) (34) (35) (36) (69) (70) (71) (72)
0.105 0.093 0.131 0.112 2701 3514 1197 3955
[0.080] [0.058] [0.101] [0.072] [3098] [3130] [3724] [3444]
N 416 722 560 972 N 440 742 596 934
R 2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 R 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bandwidth 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.20 Bandwidth 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.20
Bandwidth selection method 0.5 * IK(1) IK(1) 0.5 * IK(2) IK(2) Bandwidth selection method 0.5 * IK(1) IK(1) 0.5 * IK(2) IK(2)
Specification Specification
Number of votes Age
Vote share (within party) Female
Vote share (within 
municipality) University education
Chairman of municipal board 
(t-1) Unemployed
Chairman of municipal 
council (t-1) Student
Incumbent (t) Entrepreneur
Local linear Local quadratic
Notes: Sample includes winners and runners-up from parties that nominate the board chairman, excluding absolute majorit ies. Standard errors clustered at municipality level are 
shown in brackets. Optimal bandwidths are chosen following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). *, ** and *** denote statist ical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, 
respectively.
Incumbent (t-1) High professional
Member of parliament Municipal employee
Income (election year)
Local linear Local quadratic
Winner (t-1)
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Notes: Figures show RDD estimates from local linear and quadratic estimations (black line) at artificial cut-off 
points. Dashed lines mark the 95 % confidence intervals. 
Figure B6. Placebo thresholds graph for Table 2, Panel C. 
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Appendix C: Additional Comparisons 
 
Table C1. Policy positions by ideology, elected and all candidates. 
Panel A: Right-wing parties 
  Elected candidates  All candidates 
Variable Mean  Mean 
Deviation in policy position, public sector size 2.59  2.70 
Deviation in policy position, redistribution 2.35  2.42 
N 1876  4906 
Panel B: Left-wing parties 
  Elected candidates  All candidates 
Variable Mean  Mean 
Deviation in policy position, public sector size 2.57  2.76 
Deviation in policy position, redistribution 2.24  2.40 
N 203  700 
Notes: Sample includes politicians from the parties that nominate the board chairman 
(excluding the board chairmen). 
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Table C2. Board chairmen versus other politicians. 
  Board chairmen  Elected candidates  All candidates 
Variable Mean  Mean  Difference Mean   Difference 
Chairman of municipal 
board (t-1) 
0.35  0.01  0.33*** 0.00  0.34*** 
Chairman of local council 
(t-1) 
0.08  0.02  0.05*** 0.01  0.07*** 
Incumbent (t) 0.87  0.57  0.31*** 0.20 0.67*** 
Incumbent (t-1) 0.69  0.37  0.33*** 0.14 0.55*** 
Member of parliament 0.01  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.01** 
Age 51.73  48.57  3.16*** 47.23 4.50*** 
Wage income during 
election year 
31856  27817  4039* 23722  8134*** 
Female 0.21  0.36  -0.15*** 0.40 -0.18*** 
University education 0.21  0.21  0.01 0.17 0.04 
Unemployed 0.01  0.03  -0.01** 0.06 -0.04*** 
Student 0.00  0.02  -0.01*** 0.04 -0.03*** 
Entrepreneur 0.31  0.21  0.11*** 0.14 0.17*** 
High professional 0.25  0.25  0.00 0.20 0.05 
Municipal employee 0.12  0.23  -0.11*** 0.22 -0.09*** 
Deviation in policy 
position, public sector 
size 
2.28  2.50  -0.23*** 2.62  -0.34*** 
Deviation in policy 
position, redistribution 
2.19  2.27  -0.08  2.35   -0.16* 
N 1436  41784     150897     
Notes: Elected and all candidates exclude the board chairmen. Income during the election year is 
expressed in euros. Income and dummy for being municipal employee are not observed for the 2012 
elections. Deviations in policy position are observed only in 2012 for a subset of candidates. Statistical 
significance of the differences in means is tested using t test adjusted for clustering at the municipality 
level. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table C3. Predicting board chairman status, board chairs and winners. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Vote share (within party) 0.013*** -0.013*** -0.005 
[0.002]    [0.003]    [0.003]    
Chairman of municipal board (t-1) 0.161*** 0.259*** 0.160**  
[0.022]    [0.032]    [0.068]    
Chairman of local council (t-1) -0.037 -0.094*   0.011 
[0.035]    [0.055]    [0.085]    
Incumbent (t) 0.131*** 0.229*** 0.139*   
[0.025]    [0.041]    [0.078]    
Incumbent (t-1) 0.027 0.008 0.066 
[0.022]    [0.036]    [0.067]    
Member of parliament -0.352*** -0.494*** -0.584*** 
[0.039]    [0.051]    [0.088]    
Age 0.002**  0.007*** 0.002 
[0.001]    [0.002]    [0.003]    
Female -0.016 -0.052 -0.026 
[0.022]    [0.033]    [0.056]    
Wage income during election year   0.000   
  [0.000]      
University education   0.005 0.019 
  [0.035]    [0.059]    
Unemployed   0.004 -0.279 
  [0.117]    [0.270]    
Student   -0.085 -0.064 
  [0.152]    [0.381]    
Entrepreneur   0.111*** 0.016 
  [0.036]    [0.069]    
High professional   0.082**  0.029 
  [0.039]    [0.068]    
Municipal employee   -0.063   
  [0.041]      
Deviation in policy position, public 
sector size 
    -0.045*   
    [0.026]    
Deviation in policy position, 
redistribution 
    0.007 
    [0.028]    
N 1659 1029 315 
R2 0.49 0.28 0.22 
Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Samples used in the 
regressions include all winners and board chairmen from the party that 
nominates the board chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during 
election year are not observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy 
positions are observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All 
specifications control for party fixed effects (coefficients not reported). 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table C4. Predicting board chairman status, all elected candidates. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Rank = 1 0.216*** 0.180*** 0.229*** 
[0.020]    [0.024]    [0.049]    
Rank = 2 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.071**  
[0.012]    [0.017]    [0.032]    
Rank = 3 0.032*** 0.027*   -0.012 
[0.011]    [0.014]    [0.024]    
Vote share (within party) 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
[0.001]    [0.001]    [0.002]    
Chairman of municipal board (t-1) 0.453*** 0.444*** 0.365*** 
[0.022]    [0.028]    [0.051]    
Chairman of local council (t-1) 0.039**  0.029 0.079*   
[0.019]    [0.025]    [0.045]    
Incumbent (t) 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
[0.004]    [0.006]    [0.011]    
Incumbent (t-1) 0.017*** 0.016**  0.027**  
[0.005]    [0.007]    [0.013]    
Member of parliament -0.226*** -0.233*** -0.317*** 
[0.026]    [0.029]    [0.053]    
Age 0.000 0.001**  0.000 
[0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    
Female -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015 
[0.004]    [0.005]    [0.010]    
Wage income during election year   0.000   
  [0.000]      
University education   0.010 0.014 
  [0.009]    [0.014]    
Unemployed   0.007 -0.032 
  [0.016]    [0.029]    
Student   -0.002 0.004 
  [0.014]    [0.029]    
Entrepreneur   0.012*   0.006 
  [0.007]    [0.015]    
High professional   0.008   
  [0.008]      
Municipal employee   -0.007 0.002 
  [0.006]    [0.015]    
Deviation in policy position, public 
sector size 
    -0.012**  
    [0.005]    
Deviation in policy position, 
redistribution 
    -0.004 
     [0.006] 
N 12929 7860 2163 
R2 0.30 0.27 0.33 
Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Samples used in the 
regressions include all elected candidates from the party that nominates the 
board chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during election year 
are not observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy positions are 
observed only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All specifications control for 
party fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors clustered at 
municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table C5. Predicting board chairman status, all candidates. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Rank = 1 0.179*** 0.220*** 0.104*** 
[0.014]    [0.022]    [0.021]    
Rank = 2 0.056*** 0.085*** 0.020 
[0.010]    [0.016]    [0.018]    
Rank = 3 0.030*** 0.042*** -0.022 
[0.008]    [0.014]    [0.014]    
Vote share (within party) 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
[0.000]    [0.001]    [0.001]    
Chairman of municipal board (t-1) 0.462*** 0.432*** 0.441*** 
[0.021]    [0.028]    [0.048]    
Chairman of local council (t-1) 0.066*** 0.036 0.147*** 
[0.018]    [0.023]    [0.044]    
Incumbent (t) 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.017**  
[0.003]    [0.004]    [0.008]    
Incumbent (t-1) 0.012*** 0.012**  0.014 
[0.003]    [0.005]    [0.009]    
Member of parliament -0.168*** -0.212*** -0.199*** 
[0.023]    [0.027]    [0.046]    
Age 0.000 0.000*   0.000 
[0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000]    
Female -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.009**  
[0.001]    [0.002]    [0.004]    
Wage income during election year   0.000*     
  [0.000]      
University education   0.003 0.010 
  [0.004]    [0.007]    
Unemployed   0.004 0.001 
  [0.003]    [0.007]    
Student   0.005 0.002 
  [0.003]    [0.008]    
Entrepreneur   0.004 0.000 
  [0.003]    [0.007]    
High professional   0.002 0.003 
  [0.003]    [0.006]    
Municipal employee   -0.004*     
  [0.002]      
Deviation in policy position, public 
sector size 
    -0.005**  
    [0.002]    
Deviation in policy position, 
redistribution 
    -0.002 
    [0.003]    
N 34664 20609 5411 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 
Notes: The outcome is chairman of municipal board. Samples used in the 
regressions include all candidates from the party that nominates the board 
chair. Municipal employee status and wage income during election year are not 
observed for 2012 elections, and deviations in policy positions are observed 
only for a subset of candidates in 2012. All specifications control for party 
fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors clustered at 
municipality level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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